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That’s what the Justice Department’s Procurement Collusion Strike Force tries to discover and prosecute. The term collusion strike force, which is a mouthful. They are able to spot the indicators, the red flags of these collusive schemes and report them. Collusion and so forth. Dan Glad Sure.
However, FAR 14.404-1 subsection (c)(6) permits conversion of an IFB to a negotiated procurement only where all prices were unreasonable, for which price reasonableness can’t be determined, where the bids were collusive or where no responsive bid was received from a responsible bidder.
In its Judgment of 4 October 2012 in case C‑629/11 P Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission (ESP-ISEP) , the Court of Justice has issued another interesting decision on what should be considered sufficient debriefing of disappointed bidders in public procurement procedures. 1) (‘the Financial Regulation’).
Of all the expected benefits or functionalities, the most important ones are those attributed to public buyers and, in particular, the possibility of developing ‘category management’ insights (eg potential savings or benchmarking), systems of red flags in relation to corruption and collusion risks, and the automation of some tasks.
To nudge contracting authorities to enforce differential treatment, in 2020, the European Commission issued guidance on the participation of third country bidders and goods in EU procurement markets, stressing the several ways in which public buyers could address concerns regarding unfair competitive advantages of foreign tenderers.
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